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Abstract 
 
Innovation plays a crucial role in determining today’s economic growth patterns. But 
what enables some countries to innovate more than others? This paper employs in 
premiere a panel of sixteen Eastern European countries throughout their transition period 
exploring empirically the drivers of their national innovative capacity, a concept first 
developed in Furman et al. (2002). The significant disparities both within- and between 
Eastern Europe and its Western counterpart, in terms of innovational inputs, outputs and 
structure, provide an even more challenging task for analysis. As a proxy for the new to 
the world innovation I employ the number of international patent grants at the US patent 
office. The econometric analysis confirms the importance of R&D commitments and 
innovative tradition in the form of existing knowledge stock. Increased trade openness 
and intellectual rights protection determine higher international patenting, while the 
transition specific factors, such as structural industrial distortions or aggregated output 
drops, have a significant negative influence. Governmental funding and research 
performance of universities encourage more innovation at the technological frontier, 
while the business R&D funding in Eastern Europe is negatively correlated with it. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s global and dematerialized economy, the ability of a country to develop, 
adapt and harness its innovative potential is becoming critical in terms of long term 
economic growth and competitiveness. This fact, widely confirmed in the recent 
literature, is starting to generate concrete results in policy terms as well; the most recent 
European innovation strategies of Lisbon (2000) and Barcelona (2002) reflect this trend, 
aiming to reduce the gap between EU and US in terms of innovation, productivity and 
ultimately, economic growth. 
Since the 1980s, the concepts incorporated in the national innovation system 
(NIS) approach gained significant attention and have become a frequent framework for 
policy analysis dealing with innovation in a systemic approach. However, while most 
empirical cross-country analysis still focuses mainly on developed countries (OECD or 
newly industrialized countries), the opportunities and factors affecting the developing 
countries remain an area reserved for further research.  
This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing the innovation 
systems of 16 former centralized countries from Central and Eastern Europe, including 
the most important members of the former Soviet Union. Since early 1990s these 
countries experienced a painful transition from a closed centralized economy to a free 
market one that has impeded not only their economic performance but their innovational 
capacities as well. While the current macroeconomic successes have triggered a relapse 
of innovation output, the policy commitments still fall short from providing substantial 
support in most of these countries. Throughout the history there are a couple of 
extraordinary examples of “outsiders”, like Ireland, Finland, Israel, South Korea or 
Taiwan, which have become major global technological players in matter of decades due 
to the right mix of policies and investments. Eastern Europe needs to take better 
advantage of their own comparative advantage and build solid innovational capacities 
which will ensure sustainable economic growth and regional competitiveness. The 
objective of this study is to identify and quantify the determinants of innovation in these 
transitional countries, their challenges and problems and provide policy pointers for 
developing countries towards achieving a more systemic and efficient NIS. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background of 
national innovation systems and provides an overview of the empirical work dealing with 
these issues in a cross-country dimension. Section 3 presents the main facts concerning 
the Eastern European innovation making both historical and regional comparisons. 
Section 4 presents the empirical approach and the dataset employed for the analysis while 
Section 5 reports the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes, discussing the findings and 
policy implications.  
 
2. Perspectives on national dimensions of innovation 
 
Since the relationship between economic growth and technological development 
has been established, the question of analyzing the determinants of this capacity of 
countries to generate flows of new knowledge has been investigated by numerous 
scholars. Rather than focusing on few specific factors the concept of national innovative 
capacity (NIC) investigates the overall sources and sustainability of innovation systems at 
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the country level (Hu and Matthews, 2005). Thus, the NIC concept, defined as the ability 
of a country to produce and commercialize a flow of innovative technology over the long 
run, is a comprehensive framework converging three main sets of ideas (Furman et al., 
2002). The first source is the endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1990; Jones, 2001) 
where the flow of new ideas in the economy is modeled by a production function 
employing the existing knowledge stock and available skilled human. Secondly, Porter’s 
(1990) microeconomic framework for the interaction between the private innovative 
sector and the environment of the national industrial clusters postulates that the level of 
national innovative output relies on the degree of private R&D spending, competition, 
demand conditions, clustering of local plus supporting industries and input availability. 
Finally, there is an extensive literature dealing with the systemic approach of this issue at 
the country level. This strain of works supports the idea that innovation is significantly 
affected by the interaction of institutions, including the nature of university systems, 
intellectual property, historical industrial organization and the R&D labor division, 
private industry structure, government, all together constituting a complex system at 
work (Freeman, 1982; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) 
Within the technological change literature, patents are a common measure of 
innovational output and a good way of tracking down the flows of knowledge across 
technologies, sectors and countries. Over the last decades there has been a tremendous 
increase in the number of patents issued worldwide, especially in developed countries 
reflecting the increasing importance of dematerialized property in today’s knowledge 
based economy1. However, like any other proxy, they present both advantages and 
disadvantages, as discussed in the literature (Acs et al., 2002). Despite the latter, patents 
remain the best available source for assessing technological change and innovation since 
“nothing else comes close in quantity of available data, accessibility and the potential 
industrial organizational and technological details” (Griliches, 1990).  
 In empirical terms, most of the national innovation capacity literature focuses on 
OECD or developed countries due to issues of data availability and quality. Furman et al. 
(2002) find convergence patterns in their analysis among OECD countries. Moreover, the 
largest impact and differentiation source among different scale-type of innovators2 is 
determined by two components, namely, the R&D expenditure and GDP levels (Furman 
and Hayes, 2004). Based on the assumption that innovation grows nationally within a 
national framework of institutions, Varsakelis (2006) incorporates in his analysis specific 
measures of governance (civil liberties, political rights, free press and corruption) and 
education (mathematics and science mean scores). When exploring the role of political 
institutions persistence, findings show that the institutional system tenure, regardless of 
the type, increases US patent applications from the foreigners3, in this case the nationals 
of several Latin American and Caribbean countries (Waguespack, Birnir and Schroeder, 
                                                 
1
 Approximately 110,000 applications were filled at the European Patent Office (EPO) and almost 315,000 
were registered by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in 2000, compared with nearly 60,000 
and 108,000, respectively, in 1991. 
2
 Four types of countries (leading, middle-tier, third-tier and emerging innovators) of which the latter are, 
although not quite catching-up with the innovation at the frontier, vastly outperforming in terms of wealth 
and patents economies that historically have always exceed greatly their own. 
3
 However, when looking at domestic patenting, institutional stability has either a weekly negative or an 
insignificant effect, which is interpreted by the authors as driven by the trend of increasing patenting 
standards over time 
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2005). Hu and Matthews (2005) analyze a sample of East Asian countries through the 
lens of the NIC approach and find that the latecomer countries seem to rely mostly on the 
accumulated knowledge capacity (patent stock), the strength of innovative infrastructure 
(R&D manpower) and cluster-specific factors (specialization and private R&D) along 
public R&D funding, which is indispensable in early stages of industrial development. 
With regards to Eastern Europe, the existing NIC literature is confined to either 
descriptive analyses or case studies. Radosevic and Auriol (1999) depict six Central and 
Eastern European transitional in these terms and conclude that “although there was a 
marked downward shift in terms of ‘stocks’ of R&D spending and employment, CEECs 
have managed to maintain and intermediate position between developed and less 
developed OECD/EU economies”, failing however to transform these large stocks in 
sources of growth. Performing a detailed description of patent activity in the US from 
seven countries, Radosevic and Kutlaca (1999) decide that income levels and growth 
rates are more important than past institutional arrangements for determining the amount 
of innovation originating from EECs, their technological specialization is very much path 
dependent and that there is significant heterogeneity in how R&D is undertaken between 
various countries. An extended historical analysis of EECs’ patenting at USPTO by 
Marinova (2000) emphasizes the sharp transitional decline in technological achievements 
and reveals the regional strengths of the EECs as well as country specific ones4. Finally, 
using indexed rankings, Radosevic (2004) confirms that all EECs are below EU average 
in NIC terms and that they are giving a more homogeneous picture of a wider Europe 
considering the existing North-South differences among Western European states. 
  
3. Stylized facts about Eastern European innovation 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s a huge natural experiment began when Eastern 
European suddenly embarked on their way towards free market economies. This deep 
transformation was quite painful, with sharp falls in output, capital stocks shrinkages, 
labor force movements, trade reorientation, significant structural changes and 
institutional collapse. All these factors contributed to the U-shaped response of the GDP 
to this significant shock followed later by an overall regional relapse in late 1990s. 
This hard road of transition has left its mark on innovational output as well. In this 
section we are going to explore some stylized facts about Eastern European innovation by 
looking in more detail and historical perspective at the international patenting done by 
these countries as a proxy for their national innovative output. Specifically, the number of 
USPTO patents which comprises only “la crème” in terms of innovative output, thus, 
constituting a measure of technologically and economically significant innovations at the 
                                                 
4
 There are several pitfalls to this type of approach. First, the use of aggregated former entities (e.g. 
Yugoslavia, USSR) after their official secession is hard to justify. Second, the methodological 
inconsistencies of the old patent counts from USPTO website (not corrected until 2006) yielded 
systematically downward biased counts for some EECs, the newly formed countries especially. Finally, 
there is no base for comparisons between two different structures (before and after the fall of communism). 
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world’s commercial technology frontier5. This indicator should be consistent across 
countries and can be used successfully as a proxy one’s national innovation capacity. 
 
3.1 Historical technological divide in Europe 
The technological difference between Eastern (EECs) and Western Europe 
(WECs) is quite significant. Moreover, it holds also in the historical context when 
comparing their international patenting (see Figure 1).  
 
    (Figure 1 here) 
 
This fact is due to factors driving them in opposite ways. While the WECs increased their 
R&D commitments and their active business environment took its role in developing 
them further, the EECs during the communism persisted in their autarky and failed to 
diversify and keep the pace with the world’s technology (Murrel, 1990). In terms of 
patent intensity, defined here as the stock of patents per capita, even the most successful 
EECs are still far away from the frontier but kept an intermediate position along the 
southern periphery of Western Europe (Spain, Portugal and Greece) while the emerging 
ones still struggle at the bottom of this classification (see Table 2). In terms of patent 
assignees6, things have also substantially changed in transition, mainly due to the 
recognition of private property. As expected, the assigning percentage of patents to 
foreign entities experienced a significant increase after the 1989 regional change in 
political regimes. A more detailed analysis of this transformation is given in section 3.5. 
 
3.2 Regional innovative heterogeneity 
There is also significant differentiation within the regions. The usual North/South 
division applies to Western Europe, while for Eastern Europe the picture is more diverse 
(see Figure 2). The overall innovative leader in the communism was the former Soviet 
Union which had the vast majority of granted patents in the US between 1975 and 1995, 
counting for about 66 percent in the late 1970s, 50 percent in the early 1980s and about 
40% between 1985 and 1990. Its heir, Russia, remained on top during the transition and it 
is still responsible for about half of the USPTO patents from Eastern Europe with 3,114 
patents between 1990 and 2005. The rest of 15 countries in our sample7  can be grouped 
in innovative terms into three categories. First tier innovators average patent stocks 
between 200 and 900 during 15 years of transition. Hungary (1,068) is the most 
consistent but in a slight regression comparative with the prior period, Czech Republic 
(546) and especially Poland (522) have shown remarkable improvements while Ukraine 
(394) just rebounded after a sharp drop in the early 90s. The second tier averaged 
between 50 and 200 first inventor patents in this interval and is divided into two 
subgroups: improvers like Slovenia (248), Croatia (157), Romania (97) and Lithuania 
(78) with lower starting points and significant growth and laggards such as Bulgaria 
                                                 
5
 More significant than the national patenting since one will pursue it only if it is truly confident in the 
quality (significance and commercial potential) of his invention and if the expected gains are higher than 
the expected costs. 
6
 An assignee is the holder of the rights to use the patent for commercial purposes. 
7
 Countries that have a total of 20 or more first inventor patents in this 15 year interval; the rest are two 
small to be taken into account and/or with a lot of zero counts. 
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(134), Belarus (93) or Slovakia (102) exhibiting higher initial starting points but an 
overall regressing trend. Finally, the third tier is formed from small countries with few 
USPTO patents that seem not to have improved much over time: Latvia (40), Estonia 
(46), Georgia (27) and Serbia and Montenegro (89), a shadow in terms of innovation of 
the former Yugoslavia. 
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
3.3 Technological specialization (East vs. West) 
To compare the technological paths of Eastern and Western countries I employ 
the NBER US Patent dataset by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) and their classification 
into six broad technological categories8. The results confirm a significant decrease in 
EECs’ innovational output over the last 30 years and a significant change in their 
innovational mix in the first transitional decade (see Fig. 3). However, limited by the time 
frame (1999) the ongoing relapse in the region is not captured by this dataset. 
 
(Figure 3 here) 
 
When comparing Western and Eastern Europe’s innovative specialization, using a  
14-industry level of detail, similarities are obvious (see Figure 4). Both are strong in 
heavy industry, textiles, chemicals, food and home products categories. It seems that the 
EECs have a comparative advantage in drugs and medicine, metallurgy and energy, while 
their Western neighbours are better, as expected, in newer industries with a higher value 
added and better development perspectives, like Engines and Vehicles, Communications, 
Computers and Miscellaneous Structures. There are also signs of possible 
complementarity within a wider Europe, with Eastern strengths in and possibilities in 
pharmaceuticals as well as heavy industries while Western Europe being more 
competitive in terms of hi-tech industries such as communications, IT or automobiles. 
 
(Figure 4 here) 
 
3.4 Commitments to innovation 
There is an obvious correlation between the level of income and the national 
commitments to innovation (see Figure 5a). Overall, there was a significant regional 
reduction between 1990 and 2004 in terms of human resources employed in R&D driven 
especially by the economic fall of the former Soviet Union who had an impressive R&D 
sector before 1990 (see Figure 5b).  
(Figure 5 here) 
At the country level the picture is more diverse with some heavy reductions (Bulgaria – 
70%; Ukraine – 64%; Georgia – 53%; Romania – 45% and Russia – 41%), constancy 
(Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic states) and even 
increases in the number of researchers (Czech Republic – 34% and Poland 22%). 
However, the differences between EECs and WECs are tremendous and the GERD 
figures, even in relative terms, are significantly below the OECD median level. The 
                                                 
8
 These are: Chemical, Computers and Communication, Drugs and Medical, Electrical and Electronic, 
Mechanical and Other. 
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government remains a major player in R&D funding in Eastern Europe, while the 
involvement of businesses and higher education is still quite limited (see Figure 6a, 6b). 
 
(Figure 6 here) 
 
3.5 Old vs. New players 
Some interesting facts can be identified when looking at the distribution of main 
EEC patent holders along the transitional period (see Table 3). While virtually there was 
no foreign presence prior to mid 1990s, except the former Yugoslavia, this has 
dramatically changed in the last years especially for the first tier innovators in the region. 
Prior to 1990, individual holders and domestic entities (firms, governmental bodies or 
research institutions) were dominant (see Table 4). After 1990, the significant difference 
is represented by the emergence of global players in the EEC innovation arena such as 
General Electric, Samsung Electronics, Sun Microsystems, Ericsson or Bosch Siemens 
(see Table 5). Moreover, the orientation of dominant orientation of these patents has 
shifted from heavy and labour intensive industries towards today’s “hot” fields 
(pharmaceutical and biotech, computers and semiconductors, communications). Despite 
this last positive trend, foreign assignees are usually confined in a handful of countries, 
with Hungary and Russia leading the way in absolute numbers and Czech Republic, 
Slovenia or Croatia trailing behind, while the others have little, or no foreign assignees to 
their international patents. 
Historically, the EECs’ innovative productivity has been declining since the late 
1970s associated with growing inefficiencies of the communist regime. Moreover, 
transition made things worse through significant reductions in the research and 
development endowments and lack of incentives for the private sector. However, the 
EECs managed to retain an intermediate position between the core European countries 
and the less developed peripheral EU states. Their legacy in some key fields (e.g. 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals) and trained human resources available provides 
opportunities for a successful revival of innovation in Eastern Europe in which some the 
global R&D players are already involved. 
 
4. Measuring the determinants of innovative capacity 
 
4.1 Framework 
Departing from Furman et al. (2002), this study employs a similar specification 
additionally taking into account the particularities of transition countries. The idea 
production function based on endogenous growth theory becomes in this case: 
 
Åj,t = δj,t (Xj,tINF,  Yj,tCLUS, Zj,tLINK, Tj,tTRANS) Hj,t Aλ Aj,tφ 
 
where Åj,t is the flow of new at the frontier technologies, Hj,t Aλ is the total level of capital 
and labor resources devoted to the ideas sector of economy while  Aj,tφ is the stock of 
knowledge for country j at time t. XINF refers to factors constituting the innovational 
infrastructure and policies affecting it; YCLUS attempts to quantify the environment for 
innovation in the national industrial clusters; ZLINK’s meaning is  to capture the strength 
of existing linkages between the common infrastructure and these clusters while TTRANS 
takes into account transition specific factors that overall, have deeply impacted these 
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countries. This specification implies complementarity among its different components. 
The analysis is organized around a log-log specification (excepting the qualitative 
variables and percentages) which makes it less sensitive to outliers and easier to interpret. 
As Åj,t, proxied by the flow of patents originating from EECs, is observed with delay we 
employ a two year lag, following Furman and Hayes (2004), which takes into account the 
average processing time between patent application and grant at USPTO: 
 
log Åj,t+2 = δINF  logXj,tINF+ δCLUS logYj,tCLUS + δLINK logZj,tLINK + δTRANS logTj,tTRANS + λ 
logHj,tA + φAj,t + εj,t 
 
4.2 Variables 
In this section I will describe the variables used. Details on data sources and 
construction are provided in Appendix A. The data covers 16 EECs during the 
transitional period 1990 to 2007. More details are presented in Table 7, means and 
standard deviations in Table 8, while the pair-wise correlations are reported in Table 9. 
The main challenge was the availability and quality of data, some of these countries did 
not collect this type of data prior to mid 1990s while other adopted quite late the 
international classifications and norms9.  
Keeping in mind the pitfalls of patents as proxies for innovation, I employ in this 
analysis the number of patents at the USPTO which constitutes a good measure of 
technologically and commercially significant innovations at the world’s frontier, 
especially useful for cross-country comparisons10. 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 US$ from World Bank’s Edstat database and 
represents the aggregated national demand. Population data comes from CIA Factbook 
2006. The mean value is about 20 million people and the size of countries in our sample 
varies a lot, from a really small ones (Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia) to medium (most of 
the countries), above medium (Romania, Poland and Ukraine) and a significantly big one 
(Russia). 
The gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) comes mostly from UIS S&T 
database, UNESCO Statistical Yearbooks and OECD Main Science and Technology 
Indicators 2006 augmented with compatible national statistics data. To reflect 
innovational orientation towards industrial clusters and the quality of linkages I use a 
couple of indicators in the literature (GERD financed by business; GERD performed by 
universities) and also for robustness, the GERD financed by government, founded by Hu 
and Matthews (2005) to be more significant for the latecomers trying to catch-up.  
Researchers represent the human capital involved in R&D activities within a 
country. Due to reduced availability of the data, desire to “let the data speak” and avoid 
extrapolations, the most prevalent indicator in the case of the EECs (the head-count 
number of researchers) is used for measuring the human input into innovative activities.  
Another measure of a country’s infrastructure is represented by its openness to 
trade which can be justified both as a proxy for technology transfer through imports (Coe 
                                                 
9
 Some data is truncated towards the beginning of the analyzed period since establishing new national 
statistical offices (the case of former Yugoslav or USSR republics) is a rather lengthy process. 
10
 The great commercial potential for innovations attracted is also reflected in the largest number of patent 
applications and grants worldwide: 417,508 applications and 157,717 grants in 2005 almost half of which 
are foreign, fact that strengthens even more the above assumption (USPTO Patent Statistics Chart, 2006). 
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and Helpman, 1995) as well as an increasing competition in the market for the domestic 
EECs firms after1990 (Furman and Hayes, 2004).  
A key variable in the analysis is represented by the intellectual property rights 
regime. The IPR index used in this paper takes into account both the formal 
(commitments to IP treaties – Park and Wagh, 2002) and informal (actual enforcement 
taking place- Smarzynska, 2002) dimensions of this issue. 
The cost of doing business variable is used as a proxy for the country’s ability to 
create and stimulate the business environment through regulations, which in turn affects 
the overall innovativeness. A bureaucratic country will fail to attract foreign innovative 
firms or encourage domestic entrepreneurs to undertake innovation related activities. 
Both the number of procedures required to start a firm and the costs associated with it 
vary significantly11. Such high entry costs are associated with significant corruption, 
larger black market and low quality public goods (Djankov et al., 2001) and it is expected 
to be negatively correlated with innovational output.  
It is widely known that the countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union 
faced in the early 1990s serious challenges in reallocating resources, a result of the 
communist heritage of a closed economic system12. These distortions have disruptive 
effects both on economic as well as innovation mechanisms (Srholec, 2007) and therefore 
need to be accounted for in our regressions. Therefore, I employ in this study an 
industrial distortion index which reveals the progress of the country towards an 
international benchmark (see Appendix A). This index captures the transition from an 
over-industrialized economy towards a more balanced one with a significant service 
sector that did not exist prior to 1990. 
The cumulative output decline shows the percent difference between the end of 
transitional downturn (2000) and initial (1990) levels of GDP and is a proxy for the 
harshness of the transition affecting also the resource allocation towards innovative 
activities. Although most of the countries have surpassed the levels of development by 
2004, exceptions can be found in the former Soviet republics and the war haunted Serbia 
and Montenegro. 
In lines with the literature (Acs et al., 2002; Varsakelis, 2006) emphasizing the 
role of education in stimulating national innovation, an indicator for this ability is 
included in our analysis. Therefore I use the expenditure on tertiary and secondary 
education as a percentage of GDP in my regressions, under the assumption that a high 
educated labor force increases the amount of possible innovation undertaken in a country.  
  
4.3 Research hypothesis 
The main objective of this study is to reveal the main determinants of innovation for the 
EECs. Building on the strains of literature presented in Section 2 this study will also 
explore some pertinent research questions in the context of developing/transitional 
economies. These hypotheses are presented below. 
                                                 
11
 From the lowest 2 business days in Australia to 521 in Madagascar or a cost of 0.5percent of per capita 
GDP (USA) to 4.6 times per capita GDP in Dominican Republic. 
12
 A distinctive feature of these economies was an oversized industrial sector as a part of the economic 
development strategy during the former regime. Most of the countries had to deal with this “legacy” 
throughout the 1990s in form of privatizations, restructurings or liquidation of industrial mammoths. 
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Hypothesis 1. A stronger and effective the intellectual property rights regime 
increases the number of “new to the world” innovations that are produced in a country. 
There is an ongoing debate whether developing countries should or shouldn’t increase 
their legislative measures and enforce more vigorously in order to develop faster. One 
argument is that a strong IPR policy increases the incentives for producing local 
innovations and also attracts a larger amount of FDI with higher technological potential 
for spillovers (Smarzynska-Javorcik, 2002; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003). However, a 
multinational may invest only in labor intensive industries while the upstream R&D 
activities will still be reserved for the home office. Moreover, since IPR is applied 
equally over all sectors, the gains from attracting FDI in one industry may be offset by 
losses from the others that have benefitted through imitation (Léger, 2005; Glass, 2004). 
Hypothesis 2.  The present EEC’s ability to produce a stream of commercially 
relevant innovations relies more in present commitments rather than the existing stock of 
knowledge. Thus, by this assumption, the current human capital and financial resources 
employed should have a greater impact on commercial innovations rather than the 
amount of previous knowledge. In the case of the EECs, these knowledge stocks are 
expected to be mostly outdated and concentrated in mature industries with a present low 
propensity to patent, another negative legacy of centralized economic systems (Radosevic 
and Kutlaca, 1999). 
Hypothesis 3. Transitional countries will rely more on public expenditure on 
R&D rather than their business sector, which usually is the main driver of innovation in 
developed economies. Since the whole market economy system is still relatively new for 
the EECs, one could expect that the main push in innovative activities will come from 
publicly funded research institutions rather than private businesses which require time for 
building up competitiveness (Suarez-Villa and Hasnath, 1993; Hu and Matthews, 2005). 
 
5. Empirical analysis and results 
 
Most of the variables in the model specification enter in log form, yielding useful 
results in terms of subsequent interpretation (elasticities) and minimizing the influence of 
possible outliers. In this specification I cannot employ a fixed-effects estimation since it 
will discard all the information comprised in three key variables with only one time 
dimension13. Instead I use a GLS estimator and include various controls (year and 
regional dummies) to capture possible as much as possible from the unobserved 
heterogeneity among cross-sections (Wooldridge, 2002). Moreover, to make sure that my 
regressions are not spurious, I perform the most common two panel unit root tests 
involving regressions on lagged difference: Levin Lin and Chu (2002) which assumes a 
cross-sectional common unit root and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) that allows for 
individual unit root processes across sections. The outcomes of these tests are presented 
in the last two columns of Table 8 confirming that the variables employed are stationary. 
In addition, I run a couple of diagnostic tests to make sure that the OLS 
assumptions are not violated and the estimates are efficient. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange 
multiplier test for random effects tests if variances of groups are zero. The BP LM values 
reject the null only in the first and second model, suggesting that random effects should 
                                                 
13
 Effectiveness and enforcement of IPR, cost of doing business and cumulative transitional output drop. 
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be used in these cases against an OLS estimator. However, these two models are of no 
interest to the purpose of this study but presented to preserve similarities with previous 
studies presented in Sections 4 and 5. The results of the BP LM test confirm that an OLS 
estimator can be used for Models 3 and 4. Using a likelihood ratio test, homoskedasticity 
is firmly rejected in all models. Beyond this, serial correlation could also be biasing the 
estimates so I perform the test described by Wooldridge (2002). However, the null of no 
serial correlation can be rejected at 5 percent significance levels in all relevant models, 
proving that this is not an issue for these estimations.  
As a result of the above and to accommodate all possible issues arising from the 
econometric estimation, I will use a FGLS (feasible generalized least squares) estimator 
that is robust to first-order panel-specific autocorrelation and panel heteroscedasticity. 
Table 10 presents the panel estimations. As a robustness check, I report in the last column 
of this table, the OLS estimation of the preferred model with Newey-West standard 
errors14 which are both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent.  
Model 1 estimates a simple production function for national innovations as 
suggested by Romer (1990) and Jones (2001) including the human resources devoted to 
the R&D sector and building on the stock of previous knowledge and technological 
capital proxied here by the GDP per capita levels, as in Furman et al. (2002). The results 
show that, the comparable level of GDP PER CAPITA and human resources devoted to 
R&D (RESEARCHERS) explain a good portion of the variance in the innovative output. 
Also, a 10 percent increase in the number of researchers is associated with a 7.44 percent 
increase in national patents at USPTO while a similar increase in GDP per capita levels 
will lead to a higher output by 8.70 percent, similar to previous studies.  
Model 2 is meant to emphasize the impact of current and previous R&D efforts 
on national innovation. These are depicted, at a country level, by GERD and a direct 
measure of the existing knowledge stock (US PATENT STOCK), more appropriate than 
the one employed in Model 1. To avoid severe collinearity problems in the case of GERD 
TOTAL and RESEARCHERS (0.93), I divide the former in two components: human 
resources devoted to R&D (RESEARCHERS) and a R&D intensity measure (GERD 
PER RESEARCHER), which also varies a lot within the sample15. These three factors 
solely explain about 82 percent of the variation in patents (in the OLS estimation) and are 
highly significant statistically proving the importance of such commitments to the overall 
innovative capacity of a country.  
Finally, Model 3 comprises all variables from four postulated sources of NIC: the 
common innovative infrastructure, cluster specific factors and quality of inter-linkages 
along the year fixed effects to control for the variation in the annual rate of patenting. 
OPENNESS to trade is argued in the literature to play an important positive role as a 
channel for technology diffusion while DISTORTIONS synthesizes the structural 
distance of a former central planned economy from a free market benchmark. The 
intellectual property system and effective enforcement (IPR) comes positive and highly 
significant implying that one legislative and implementation efforts of tougher IPR will 
                                                 
14
 Uses autocorrelations up to m=4 to compute the standard errors. For the truncation parameter I employ 
the usual rule of thumb and compute it as (0.75*(N^1/3)) which equals 3.92, rounded up to 4. The 
estimations for Models 1 to 3 are not reported here due to space constraints, but are available upon request. 
15
 In 2002 the computed annual GERD per researcher ranged from $ 3,492 (Georgia) to $118,000 
(Slovenia) in real PPP terms. 
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yield positive national outcomes as well. The regulatory and bureaucratic burden (COST 
OF DOING BUSINESS) acts as a break while the public support for innovation 
(GOVERNMENTAL R&D FUNDING) shows a positive influence over the number of 
international patents granted. As additional controls for the severity/adversity of 
economic transition in these countries, I use an aggregated CUMULATIVE OUTPUT 
DECLINE measure. The cluster specific factor (BUSINESS R&D FUNDING) shows the 
inefficiency of business driven R&D in these countries, where most of the firms are 
rather adopters and importers of technology rather than producers of new-to-the-world 
innovations. The quality of linkages proxied by the UNIV R&D PERFORMANCE 
emphasizes the importance of these connections for technology development, still 
underdeveloped in the Eastern European space. Consistent with Hu and Matthews (2005) 
the public finance of research (GOVERNMENTAL R&D FUNDING) has a positive 
effect over national patenting. This model explains about 90 percent of the variance in 
patents and most of the regressors remain statistically significant.  
The last equation presents the preferred model (Model 4) which drops the 
statistically insignificant variables from the previous one. This yields similar estimates 
for all variables included and an overall fit, exploring also regional effects through 
regional dummies16. The results are robust and the OLS estimates with Newey West 
standard errors, reported in the last column, confirm the magnitude and significance of 
the FGLS estimates. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
 This study contributes to the developing empirical literature investigating the 
determinants of innovation at a national level in non-OECD countries, specifically the 
transitional countries of Eastern Europe. The approach undertaken builds on the 
theoretical grounds laid down by the national innovation systems literature and the 
eclectic combination of traditional economic modeling and qualitative approach shown in 
Furman et al. (2002). 
From the results a number of interesting observations as well as policy 
recommendations emerge. When comparing the EECs to the OECD countries or the East 
Asian “tigers”, keeping in mind the methodological differences with these previous 
studies, one finds both important similarities and differences. The core common finding 
is that their variation in the rate of patenting is accounted by two variables, namely the 
past stock of R&D and the present commitments (expenditure and manpower). Similar to 
Western countries, the EECs’ output seems to be positively influence by stronger 
protection of intellectual property, trade openness and gross expenditure on research and 
development. The findings support the literature arguing for a better protection of 
intellectual right, especially in the case of the EECs who possess the human endowment 
but lack serious R&D investments. Such measures can attract foreign direct investment in 
high tech industries as well, breaking the usual pattern of shifting only the labor intensive 
industries from developed Europe East-wards. The increased openness to trade 
throughout the 1990s is positively correlated with the production of international patents 
acting both as a channel for technological infusion and a stimulus for domestic exporters 
                                                 
16
 For the former Soviet Union which have experienced the hardest transitional falls and the small Baltics. 
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in the few dynamic industries left in the EECs, such as pharmaceuticals. From the 
regression coefficients one can conclude that the emphasis in the EECs remains on the 
human commitments. This is probably due to the relative scarcity of funds contributing to 
GERD corroborated with an outdated stock of patents due to its regional specialization, 
yielding little potential for subsequent innovations. Different from OECD, but resembling 
the results for the Asian countries, I find that expenditure on tertiary and secondary 
education has little statistical impact, while public R&D funding increases the number of 
international patents, especially in the initial period when the private sector is still small 
in size. As expected, the macroeconomic transitional forces play an important role 
especially in the 1990s when the hard adjustments were taking place. The communist 
industrial legacy has left these countries with huge adjustment problems that have taken a 
high toll on social and economic development. However, by the year 2000 most of them 
have adjusted to a market type of economy and rebounded successfully from their 
transitional decline. Both the newly developed industrial distortions index and aggregated 
negative transitional shock (output decline) are influencing negatively and significantly 
the amount of new to the world innovation from EECs. 
However, there are also aspects that are quite different from previous results. The 
impact of domestic business R&D spending over innovational output is negative and 
statistically significant in Eastern Europe, a robust result through various specifications 
and econometric estimations. This fact contradicts other findings pertinent to developed 
countries (OECD, NIC), where private R&D investment is an important driver of 
innovation17. In order to better understand this phenomenon, we have to take a closer 
look at Table 3 presenting the distribution of EEC’s patent holders. There is an obvious 
concentration towards individuals and foreign entities in all countries in detriment of 
domestic ones, with Hungary having the most balanced mix, as a proof that only in this 
case all the channels are efficiently exploited18. However, the general trend is that 
domestic Eastern European firms are innovating less now than the in the past, fact 
confirmed also by the European Innovation Scoreboard (2006) in which with the 
exception of Slovakia and Czech Republic, all the listed EECs perform poorly in terms of 
business expenditures on research19. This reveals some structural weaknesses with firm 
level innovation identified in more detailed case studies of Poland (Kubielas et al., 2003), 
Hungary (Szalavetz, 2003), Slovenia (Bucar and Stare, 2003) or Romania (Gheorghiu 
and Turlea, 2003). With few notable exceptions20, the domestic business environment has 
a low innovative potential which translates into a reduced international competitiveness, 
reliance on imports of technology and equipment and a predominant orientation towards 
trade and services. The current trend could have severe consequences in the near future 
and the importance of public policy in these matters is evident.  
Another weakness of the EECs is represented by the linkages between business 
environment and higher education sector, virtually missing in terms of research and 
development. In a similar way, the importance of public R&D funding should remain a 
                                                 
17
 Moreover, the early EECs’ statistics do not differentiate between private and public businesses and the 
later were predominant until the late 1990s (and still are in some countries). 
18
 The notable exception being Slovenia, with a good domestic pharmaceutical industry but very low levels 
of FDI. 
19
 Under 0.5 percent of GDP while the leaders (Sweden, Japan, USA) invest between 2.4 and 1.91 percent 
20
 Countries like Hungary, Russia and Slovenia and only few industries (pharmaceutical, chemical, energy) 
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priority in many of these countries, which are now starting to explore the production of 
commercial innovations and lack a proper infrastructure to develop them. However, the 
recovery or development of such mechanisms does not take place in many of the EECs, 
which may explain their low international patenting rates. 
To conclude, the overall findings fit the lines of previous literature. For the EECs 
as well, the R&D expenditure remains the most important factor in determining national 
innovative output, followed by the human resource commitment in form of researchers 
involved and to a lesser extent the existing tradition and knowledge stock (“standing on 
shoulders of giants” type of effect). Policy wise, better IPR protection and enforcement 
will probably attract both foreign investors in superior industries capable of locally 
creating new-to-the-world knowledge and motivate domestic firms and inventors. Trade 
openness functions successfully as a channel for technology diffusion but without the 
proper absorptive infrastructure (business financed R&D, high tertiary and secondary 
education, involvement of universities) cannot achieve the critical mass needed for 
domestic international patenting to become significant. The macro realities of transition 
have less and less of a negative effect in the present, when countries have improved and 
stabilized their economies through reforms and privatization. Overall, the analysis finds 
that both innovation oriented policies and a balanced innovation investment mix are, in 
the case of Eastern European countries, prerequisites to develop their national innovation 
capacities and ensure their competitiveness on international markets. Even though these 
countries are living proof that innovation takes place despite inefficient policies, the need 
for a sustained growth in the region through knowledge accumulation is obvious. This 
becomes even more important now, when the usual drivers (efficient reallocation of 
resources and comparative advantage in labor intensive industries) are slowly petering 
out through economic integration within a larger Europe. 
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List of abbreviations 
 
CEECs Central and Eastern European countries including: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia, Serbia, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania. 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States is the unofficial heir of the former 
Soviet Union (consists of 11 former Soviet Republics: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) 
EECs generically referring to all Eastern European countries; includes CEECs, 
SEEs (South Eastern countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro) and CIS countries 
 EU  European Union 
 FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
 FGLS  Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
 GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
 GLS  Generalized Least Squares 
 IPR   Intellectual Property Rights 
 OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 NBER  National Bureau of Economic Research 
 NIC  National Innovative Capacity 
 R&D   Research and Development 
 S & T  Science and Technology 
 WECs   Western European Countries 
UIS  UNESCO Institute for Statistics  
USPTO  United States Patent and Trademark Office 
 
 Figure 1 Trends in patenting in the USA. Eastern-Western European comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Innovators in Eastern Europe and conditional convergence (1990-2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3 Technological specialization: East vs. West. Historical comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Detailed technological specialization comparison using USPTO patent stocks (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5a and 5b GERD in EECs as a percentage of GDP broken down by sources of funds 
(GOV- Governmental, BUS- Business, HED- Higher Education) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6a and 6b. R&D intensity, GDP per capita and researchers in Eastern Europe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 Variables employed for Eastern European countries in the sample (2004 or the latest available year) 
 
 
Country Population GDP per 
capita
GDP per 
capita*
Recent real 
GDP growth
USPTO 
patents Researchers GERD IPR index
Trade 
Openness
Cost 
Business Distortions
Output 
decline
Education 
spending
Public 
R&D
Private 
R&D
University 
R&D
(millions) ($ US 2006) ($ US PPP) (2001-05) (90-06) (thousands) (% GDP) - - (days) - (1990-2000) (% GDP) (% GERD) (% GERD) (% perf)
Bulgaria 7.7 3,683 9,975 4.9% 141 10.45 0.49% 5.14 141.47 32 0.296 -9.12% 2.40% 71.41% 18.52% 10.04%
Belarus 10.3 3,552 8,688 6.9% 101 18.56 0.62% 3.19 154.47 77 0.524 -9.72% 3.78% 32.60% 50.97% 16.43%
Czech 
Republic 10.2 13,035 20,563 3.2% 598 30.64 1.22% 9.57 154.13 36 0.274 3.31% 3.45% 22.97% 61.08% 15.63%
Estonia 1.3 9,882 17,672 6.2% 50 5.09 0.75% 5.72 178.04 47 0.261 5.52% 3.18% 16.97% 30.62% 47.82%
Georgia 4.7 986 3,277 7.2% 29 12.00 0.29% 3 87.8 22 0.184 -56.60% 1.85% 83.73% - 16.27%
Croatia 4.5 8,422 13,186 4.3% 178 11.14 1.12% 3.71 115.39 48 0.167 -6.49% 3.25% 22.26% 42.66% 35.08%
Hungary 10.0 11,885 17,733 3.6% 1129 29.76 1.02% 11.25 164.03 45 0.266 12.52% 3.54% 32.85% 35.47% 25.16%
Lithuania 3.6 7,342 15,464 7.3% 77 9.52 0.67% 2.57 122.26 26 0.195 -24.77% 3.15% 33.39% 16.86% 49.75%
Latvia 2.3 7,175 13,938 7.4% 44 6.10 0.42% 5.76 99.71 16 0.242 -16.51% 3.45% 18.99% 40.88% 40.12%
Poland 38.5 8,602 14,137 3.0% 586 90.84 0.58% 9.69 66.46 31 0.143 41.14% 3.42% 45.46% 20.34% 33.92%
Romania 22.3 3,985 8,602 6.0% 118 24.64 0.38% 2.71 92.93 20 0.208 -12.92% 2.80% 24.17% 60.26% 15.56%
Russia 142.9 6,143 12,142 6.1% 3383 414.68 1.25% 6.08 75.23 35 0.425 -31.78% 1.68% 24.46% 69.88% 5.42%
Serbia and 
Montenegro 8.0 3,383 5,549 4.8% 91 10.86 1.17% 2.20 39.50 35 0.598 -37.86% 1.85% 44.19% 3.95% 51.86%
Slovakia 5.4 10,326 17,266 4.6% 111 15.39 0.57% 9.57 172.51 51 0.330 1.32% 2.92% 26.56% 64.33% 9.10%
Slovenia 2.0 18,816 23,102 3.4% 274 4.64 1.53% 10.56 123.47 60 0.108 19.77% 3.24% 23.06% 59.68% 15.55%
Ukraine 46.7 2,245 7,802 8.6% 437 85.21 0.95% 6.08 119.32 35 0.520 -54.15% 3.20% 40.00% 54.59% 5.41%
 
 Table 2 Patent stock and intensity in Western and Eastern Europe as of 2005 
 
Country Patent stock* Patent intensity** 
Switzerland 44,471 5,937.88 
Sweden 31,051 3,449.43 
Germany 230,906 2,801.19 
Finland 11,939 2,285.66 
Netherlands 33,524 2,043.21 
Denmark 10,161 1,870.47 
France 95,830 1,579.89 
Belgium 15,972 1,541.05 
Austria 12,264 1,498.41 
Norway 5,079 1,105.80 
Iceland 244 822.28 
United Kingdom 44,243 732.00 
Italy 41,208 709.22 
Ireland 2,537 631.77 
Hungary 2,544 254.88 
Slovenia 337 167.63 
Spain 6,086 150.86 
Czech Republic 1,344 131.31 
Estonia 90 67.96 
Bulgaria 461 62.42 
Croatia 255 56.73 
Greece 550 51.55 
Russian Federation 5,743 40.19 
Latvia 84 36.93 
Slovakia 182 33.46 
Belarus 303 29.44 
Lithuania 97 27.05 
Portugal 279 26.40 
Ukraine 1,123 24.04 
Poland 860 22.32 
Serbia and Montenegro 161 20.12 
Georgia 49 10.51 
Romania 219 9.82 
  
* USPTO patents between 1976 and 2005 
** Current patent stock per million people 
 
Note:  
Patent stocks for countries with a different status prior to 1991 (USSR, Yugoslavia) or (1993) 
were estimated using the 5 year relative average percentage after they broke up. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 Main Eastern European patent holders*. Breakout by organizations** 
 
  
1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
  
I F N I F N I F N 
Bulgaria 4 0 7 5 0 0 13 0 0 
Belarus 1 0 1 5 0 5 8 0 1 
Czech Republic .. .. .. 10 5 10 32 22 8 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 
Georgia 1 0 0 3 0 0 2 8 0 
Croatia 0 0 0 16 0 18 15 13 11 
Hungary 49 0 237 49 27 70 66 59 48 
Latvia 0 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 
Poland 8 2 9 12 4 5 13 3 2 
Romania 0 0 0 7 0 0 14 0 0 
Russia 10 3 0 160 14 2 216 28 3 
Slovakia .. .. .. 3 0 0 11 0 0 
Slovenia 4 0 0 17 1 8 0 8 23 
Ukraine 4 0 0 24 2 0 19 19 0 
 
Source:  
Based on a report from Patent Technology Monitoring Branch (PTMB) "Count of 1969 - 2005 Utility 
Patent Grants by calendar year of grant" 
      * Organizations receiving 5 or more utility patents during 1969-2004 
** I - individuals; F - foreign entities (firms, universities); N - domestic entities (research institutes, 
institutions) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Main organizations holding Eastern European patents in the communism (1969-1989) 
 
No Code Name of the organization Country Patents Main Field of Activity
1 N CESKOSLOVENSKA AKADEMIE VED Czechoslovakia 425 Education
2 N RICHTER GEDEON VEGYESZETI GYAR RT * Hungary 267 Pharmaceutical
3 N CHINOIN GYOGYSZER ES VEGYESZETI TERMEKEK GYARA RT. * Hungary 224 Pharmaceutical
4 N ELITEX ZAVODY TEXTILNIHO STROJIRENSTVI GENERALNI REDITELSTVI Czechoslovakia 121 Textiles
5 N VYZKUMNY USTAV BAVLNARSKY Czechoslovakia 105 Textiles
6 N EGYT GYOGYSZERVEGYESZETI GYAR Hungary 69 Pharmaceutical
7 N SPOFA, UNITED PHARMACEUTICAL WORKS Czechoslovakia 52 Pharmaceutical
8 N ADAMOVSKE STROJIRNY, NARODNI PODNIK Czechoslovakia 50 Polygraphic presses
9 N VYZKUMNY A VYVOJOVY USTAV ZAVODU VSEOBECNEHO STROJIRENSTVI Czechoslovakia 50 Metallurgy
10 N INSTITUT ELEKTROSVARKI IMENI E.O. PATONA AKADEMII NAUK UKRAI USSR 48 Metallurgy
11 N ELITEX, KONCERN TEXTILNIHO STROJIRENSTVI Czechoslovakia 36 Textiles
12 N MEDICOR MUVEK Hungary 30 Medical equipment
13 N ESZAKMAGYARORSZAGI VEGYIMUVEK Hungary 29 Chemical
14 N INSTITUT GORNOGO DELA SIBIRSKOGO OIDELENIA AKADEMII NAUK SSS USSR 25 Metallurgy
15 N INSTITUTE PO METALOZNANIE I TECHNOLOGIA NA METALITE Bulgaria 24 Metallurgy
16 N MINISTERUL INDUSTRIEI CONSTRUCTIILOR DE MASINI Romania 23 Government
17 N VSESOJUZNY NAUCHNO-ISSLEDOVATELSKY I PROEKTNO-KONSTURKTORSKY USSR 22 Constructions
18 N POLITECHNIKA GDANSKA INSTYTUT CHEMII I TECHNOLOGII ORGANICZN Poland 19 Education
19 N POLITECHNIKA WARSZAWSKA Poland 19 Education
20 N LEK TOVARNA FARMACEVTSKIH IN KEMICNIH IZDELKOV, N.SOL.O. Yugoslavia 17 Pharmaceutical
 
 
Source:  
Based on a report from Patent Technology Monitoring Branch (PTMB) "Count of 1969 - 2005 Utility 
Patent Grants by calendar year of grant" 
      * Organizations receiving 5 or more utility patents during 1969-2004 
** F - foreign entities (firms, universities); N - domestic entities (research institutes, institutions) 
 
 
  
Table 5 Main organizations holding Eastern European patents in transition period (1989-2005) 
 
No Code Name of the organization Country Patents Main Field of Activity
1 N RICHTER GEDEON VEGYESZETI GYAR RT Hungary 79 Pharmaceutical
2 N CHINOIN GYOGYSZER ES VEGYESZETI TERMEKEK GYARA RT. Hungary 74 Pharmaceutical
3 N EGIS GYOGYSZERGYAR Hungary 63 Pharmaceutical
4 F GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY Hungary 51 Various
5 F SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. Russia 36 Electronics
6 N ELBRUS INTERNATIONAL LTD. Russia 32 Computer Technology
7 F LSI LOGIC CORPORATION Russia 31 Communications; Semiconductors
8 F GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY Russia 30 Various
9 F SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC. Russia 30 Computer Technology
10 N BIOGAL GYOGYSZERGYAR RT. Hungary 26 Chemicals
11 N PLIVA FARMACEUTSKA, KEMIJSKA, PREHRAMBENA I KOZMETICKA Croatia 24 Pharmaceutical; Cosmetics
12 N LEK PHARMACEUTICAL AND CHEMICAL COMPANY D.D. Slovenia 24 Pharmaceutical;Chemicals
13 F AJINOMOTO COMPANY INCORPORATED Russia 21 Food
14 F CERAM OPTEC INDUSTRIES, INC. Russia 21 Optical fiber; Lasers
15 N
OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE OBSCHESTVO "NAUCHNO-PROIZVODSTVENNOE 
OBIEDINENIE "ENERGOMASH" IMONI AKADEMIKA KAKSOLMIKA V.P. 
GLUSHKO" 
Russia 20 Energy; Engines
16 F R-AMTECH INTERNATIONAL, INC. Russia 19 Emerging Technologies
17 F TELEFONAKTIEBOLAGET LM ERICSSON Hungary 18 Telecommunications
18 N TUNGSRAM RESZVENYTARSASAG Hungary 18 Lighting
19 F BOSCH SIEMENS HAUSGERATE GMBH Slovenia 16 Household appliances
20 F UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Russia 16 Education
21 F SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS INDUSTRIES, LLC Czech Republic 15 Semiconductors
22 N GYOGYSZERKUTATO INTEZET KFT Hungary 15 Pharmaceutical
 
 
Source:  
Based on a report from Patent Technology Monitoring Branch (PTMB) "Count of 1969 - 2005 Utility 
Patent Grants by calendar year of grant" 
      * Organizations receiving 5 or more utility patents during 1969-2004 
** F - foreign entities (firms, universities); N - domestic entities (research institutes, institutions) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Index of Intellectual Property Protection Effective Enforcement 
 
Score Description 
3 Close to adequate IPR legislation present by the 
end of 1995; some enforcement efforts undertaken 
2 Close to adequate IPR legislation present by the 
end of 1995; no enforcement efforts undertaken 
1 Lack of adequate IPR legislation at the end of 1995 
 
Source:  
Building on Smarzynska Javorcik (2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Full variable name Definition Source 
PATENTS j,t+2 USPTO patents to country j in year t+2 All patents granted to inventors from country j  USPTO Online Database; author's own calculations 
GDP PER CAPITA j,t GDP per capita in US $ 2000 constant Gross domestic product per capita in constant prices World Bank Development Indicators 2007 
US PATENT STOCK j,t USPTO patent stocks up to year t for country j 
The stock of all patents granted to country j 
between 1976 and year t computed using 
perpetual inventory method 
USPTO Online Database; author's own 
calculations 
RESEARCHERS j,t The number of researchers The total number of labor employed in R&D activities (head count) 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999;UIS 
S&T database; Eurostat; various national 
statistics offices  
R&D INTENSITY j,t Aggregated R&D expenditure per researcher employed 
Total R&D expenditures (millions US$ 2000) per 
number of researchers 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999;UIS 
S&T database; Eurostat; various national 
statistics offices  
IPR j Intellectual property protection and enforcement index 
The actual effective degree of protection and 
enforcement of intellectual property in country j 
own calculations based on Ginarte and 
Park (1997); Park and Wagh (2002); 
Smarzynska (2002); 
OPENNESS j,t Degree of openness to international trade Exports plus imports divided by GDP in constant prices, expressed as a percent own calculations 
COST DOING 
BUSINESS
 j 
Cost of doing business in country j Number of days necessary to start a business in 
country j (average of available years 2003-2006) World Bank Doing Business database 
EDUCATION j,t Spending on higher education as a % of GDP Percentage of GDP spent on secondary and tertiary education World Bank Edstat data 
PUBLIC R&D FUNDING j,t Percentage of R&D funded by government R&D expenditures funded by government divided by total R&D expenditures 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999;UIS 
S&T database; various national statistics 
offices  
DISTORTIONS j,t Structural distortion index 
Industrial distortion index as the sum of 
deviations from the benchmark shares of 
employment in four sectors 
own calculations 
OUTPUT DECLINE j Cumulative output decline in transition The percent difference between 2000 and 1990 GDP levels (US$ 2000) WDI 2007; author's own calculation 
BUSINESS R&D 
FUNDING j,t Percentage of R&D funded by private businesses 
R&D expenditures funded by industry divided by 
total R&D expenditures 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999;UIS 
S&T database; various national statistics 
offices; OECD MSTI 2007  
UNIVERSITY R&D 
PERFORMANCE j,t Percentage of R&D performed by universities 
R&D expenditures funded by higher education 
divided by total R&D expenditures 
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999;UIS 
S&T database; various national statistics 
offices; OECD MSTI 2007 
 
Table 7 Variables, measures, definitions and sources 
 Table 8 Descriptive statistics of the variables employed and panel unit root tests 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max LL IPS 
Log Patents 257 2.480 1.364 0.000 5.841 -6.23*** -4.17*** 
Log GDP per researcher 209 2.173 0.908 -0.616 4.214 -11.57*** -4.92*** 
Log Researchers 220 9.987 1.288 8.218 13.808 -2.57*** 1.22 
Log Stock of USPTO patents 288 3.812 1.498 0.286 7.409 -5.84*** -3.90*** 
Log Openness to Trade 232 -7.195 0.585 -9.419 -5.960 -4.37*** -2.93*** 
IPR index 288 6.050 3.041 2.200 11.250 - - 
Cost business 288 38.449 15.272 16.000 76.500 - - 
Education share 196 0.031 0.007 0.013 0.048 -4.53*** -1.40* 
Governmental R&D funding 165 0.700 2.760 0.200 35.900 -1083.1*** 
-
170.98*** 
Log Distortion Index 236 -1.202 0.420 -2.253 0.202 -4.08*** -2.55*** 
Transitional output decline 288 -11.021 25.282 -56.598 41.140 - - 
Business R&D funding 167 0.423 0.149 0.077 0.728 -8.37*** -1.40* 
University performed R&D 178 0.204 0.143 0.019 0.560 -8.19*** -0.89 
 
Note:  
All panel unit root tests include individual effects and individual linear trends; 
Variables for which a value for this test is not available do not possess a time dimension in our data set; 
The null hypothesis for these tests is non-stationarity (unit root); 
*, ** and *** indicate parameters that are significant at the 10%, 5% and respectively 1%; 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 Pair-wise correlations 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 log(US patents) 1.00
2 log(gerd/researcher) 0.27 1.00
3 log(researchers) 0.65 -0.25 1.00
4 log(US patent stock) 0.89 0.31 0.68 1.00
5 log (openness_trade) 0.18 0.38 -0.24 0.31 1.00
6 IPR regime 0.50 0.55 0.09 0.48 0.27 1.00
7 cost of doing business 0.08 0.35 -0.14 0.20 0.44 0.26 1.00
8 education spending -0.44 0.00 -0.43 -0.43 0.08 0.02 0.20 1.00
9 GERD funded government -0.02 0.11 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 0.08 0.10 -0.04 1.00
10 log(industrial distortions) -0.02 -0.42 0.35 0.05 -0.09 -0.23 0.12 -0.01 -0.03 1.00
11 cummulative output drop 0.19 0.67 -0.23 0.23 0.23 0.67 0.36 0.08 0.09 -0.55 1.00
12 GERD funded business 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.30 -0.17 0.34 0.07 -0.27 0.01 0.06 0.04 1.00
13 GERD performed university -0.28 0.08 -0.49 -0.32 0.11 -0.16 -0.10 0.47 0.06 -0.28 0.13 -0.61 1.00
Variables
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 Determinants of new Eastern European innovations (FGLS estimation) 
 
Dependent Variable = LN (PATENTS) j,t+2 
MODELS Model 1 Model 2 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 4' 
Baseline R&D Full Preferred OLS 
Variables model   commitments specifications model   Newey West † 
Common innovative infrastructure 
    
      
A LN GDP PER CAPITA 0.870*** 
  
  
  
  (0.086) 
  
  
A LN US PATENT STOCK   0.646*** 0.358*** 0.397*** 0.429*** 
  
    (0.058) (0.094) (0.081) (0.075) 
HA LN RESEARCHERS 0.744*** 0.208** 0.527*** 0.576*** 0.636*** 
  
  (0.069) (0.064) (0.144) (0.085) (0.097) 
HA LN GERD PER RESEARCHER   0.257*** 0.477*** 0.441*** 0.588*** 
  
    (0.067) (0.119) (0.109) (0.149) 
XINF OPENNESS 0.210 0.157 0.393* 
  
    
(0.201) (0.187) (0.198) 
XINF IPR   0.140*** 0.122*** 0.083** 
  
    
(0.039) (0.035) (0.031) 
XINF COST DOING BUSINESS   -0.009 
 
  
  
    
(0.010) 
 
  
XINF EDUCATION SHARE   1.77 
 
  
  
    
(7.488) 
 
  
XINF GOVERNMENTAL R&D FUNDING   0.014 0.014 0.014*** 
  
    
(0.012) (0.010) (0.005) 
Transition specific Factors 
  
  
  
TTRANS DISTORTIONS   -0.349** -0.432*** -0.491* 
  
    
(0.174) (0.157) (0.264) 
TTRANS OUTPUT DECLINE   -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.016*** 
  
    
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cluster specific innovation environment 
  
  
  
YCLUS BUSINESS R&D FUNDING   -0.652 -0.837* -1.381** 
  
    
(0.597) (0.494) (0.575) 
Quality of linkages 
  
  
  
ZLINK UNIV R&D PERFORMANCE   1.528** 0.801 0.707 
  
    
(0.751) (0.548) (0.710) 
Controls 
  
  
  
  CIS dummy   0.586 0.245 0.201 
    (0.477) (0.149) (0.234) 
  Baltics dummy   -0.207 0.072 0.107 
    (0.359) (0.225) (0.269) 
  Year fixed effects   no yes yes yes yes 
Constant   -11.744*** -2.370*** -4.270* -5.282*** -4.915*** 
    (1.054) (0.718) (2.350) (1.240) (1.165) 
Wald Chi square / F test 173.94*** 590.18*** 1578.72*** 1482.01*** 3713.92*** 
N   214 204 134 143 143 
LR test: Ho no heteroskedasticity 226.04*** 152.46*** 101.97*** 115.23*** 115.23*** 
Breusch-Pagan LM test: Ho: OLS; Ha: GLS; 110.13*** 40.42*** 2.60 3.25* 3.25* 
Woolridge test: Ho no serial correlation 7.091** 8.605* 5.241* 4.455* 4.455* 
 
GLS estimation robust to heteroskedasticity and group specific autocorrelation of order one. 
* P<0.1; ** P< 0.05; *** P<0.01; † Regression with Newey-West standard errors (maximum lags = 4) 
Appendix A: Data note 
 
Sample countries 
The 16 countries considered for this study includes: Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia 
and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. 
 
Patent counts 
Patent counts are drawn from the USPTO Full Text Database available online containing 
all patents issued in the USA to inventors originating in our sample countries. I use this 
measure instead of the usual “first inventor” utility patent measure for two reasons: first, 
the at the beginning of our analysis these countries were just getting started thus their 
patent numbers are very low and by using an “all inventor” approach the number of zero 
yearly totals is lowered; secondly, this measures allows for collaborative inventions 
which have an Eastern European inventors but not necessarily restricting us to the first 
one listed. The two aggregated counts are however very strongly correlated (0.9865) thus 
by doing this I gain a bit in terms of variance while taking into account all innovative 
output with origins in the EECs. Also, for accuracy, the early numbers have been 
corrected in the case of countries that have broken up during or at the beginning of the 
1990s by individual patent assessment and reassignment of those emitted after the 
breakup point towards one of the former component countries based on the geographical 
location of the inventor. All null observations have been converted to 0.001 in order to 
make it possible to take logs. 
 
Patent stocks 
For computations of the patent stocks in year t, I use the perpetual inventory model and 
taking into account the number of patents flows between the initial year 1963 and t-1. 
The initial patent stock was computed using the method developed by Griliches (1990): 
S0 = P0 / (g + δ) where g is the average growth rate for the first ten years of available data 
and δ is the depreciation rate, set at 15%, the most common rate used in the literature for 
discounting patent flows. The subsequent stocks are computed as St = (1- δ) St-1 + Pt, 
where Pt equals the flow of patents from the current year. 
 
Openness to trade 
Data comes on imports, exports from the IMF Direction of Trade Database 2007 
(DOTS). Openness to trade is computed as the total trade amount (imports plus exports) 
as a proportion of GDP. 
 
Researchers 
The total head count takes into account also a rather small percentage (usually between 5 
and 10 percent of the total) of technicians and auxiliary personnel which are supporting 
the innovative activity of full time researchers. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) index 
The most widely used in similar studies use the Ginarte and Park (1997) index of patent 
rights or its updated version by Park and Wagh (2002) which place Hungary and Croatia 
on top, while Lithuania and Bulgaria are on the opposite side of the spectrum1. However, 
in the case of the EECs as well as in many other developing countries, the “official” 
enforcement standard often differs significantly from the actual existing one. In order to 
control for this, a measure of the actual enforcement implemented in these countries is 
more appropriate (Radosevic, 2004). Thus, an IPR index like the one developed by 
Smarzynska Javorcik (2002) serves better our analysis2 (see Table 6, Annex 1). The IPR 
index employed is a combination of the above two dimensions: legislative protection 
(Ginarte-Park index) and the degree of enforcement (US Special 301). I have extended it 
also for the former Yugoslav republics which were not covered (e.g. Serbia and 
Montenegro, Slovenia and Croatia) based on the same ranking guidelines which are in 
Table 6. 
 
Cost of doing business 
The variable used in this study was computed using the 2003-2006 average duration for 
starting up a new business, indicating the regulatory cost of business. World Bank’s 
Doing Business database provides objective measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement in comparable terms across 175 economies. The limitation of this dataset is 
given by its rather short time span (2003-2006) which covers only a relatively recent 
period. 
 
Industrial distortion index 
The distortion index is based on the benchmark employment percentages in four broad 
sectors (agriculture, industry, market-oriented services and non-market-oriented services) 
in 50 other market based economies and after controlling for levels of GDP following the 
estimation in Raiser et al. (2004)3. The index is computed using the Euclidian distance 
formula as follows: 
DISTj,t = SQRT{(Sa – Sab)^2  + (Si – Sib)^2 + (Sms – Smsb)^2 + (Snms – Snmsb)^2},  
where Si represents the actual share of employment in sector i and Sib represents the 
benchmark share in the same sector. The index is a measure of the overall distance of an 
economy from a market economy with the same per capita income. The values come 
from my own computations using employment data available through LABORSTA (the 
International Labor Office statistics database) and GDP per capita levels from the World 
Bank’s Development Indicators 2007. 
 
Expenditure on tertiary and secondary education 
The public national expenditure on education is collected mainly from the World Bank’s 
EdStats database and completed with data from national statistics offices. The 
                                                 
1
 This index is constructed by taking into account five dimensions of patent protection: the extent of 
coverage, membership in international patent agreements, protection from restrictions on patent rights, 
duration and mechanisms of enforcement, all broken down into sub-categories with assigned weights 
yielding final index values between 0 and 5, with 5 being the highest degree of IPR protection. 
2
 This simple index is capturing both the legislative and actual enforcement of the IPR regime and it is 
based on the description of IPR regimes by the International Intellectual Property Alliance in their 
recommendations for countries to be placed on the US Special 301 Watch list paying close attention to 
trademark and copyright laws. 
3
 However, their index is defined differently as the sum of absolute values of (s-s*) divided by 2, where s is 
the actual share of employment in sector j, and s* is the benchmark in the same sector. 
percentages of tertiary and secondary expenditures vary between 0.42 and 0.73 among 
countries but very little over time within the same national entity. 
